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State Department review completed



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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CONTENTS

25X1

- 2. USSR: Reports on the background and causes of Khrushchev's downfall emphasize the differences within the leadership. (Page 3)
- 3. Sudan: The dissolution of the Supreme Military Council and cabinet and the formation of a new government is aimed at conciliating anti-regime sentiment. (Page 6)
- 4. UK - UAR - Aden: Wilson government moving to improve relations with Arab states. (Page 7)
- 5. Gabon: French apparently force President Mba to step down. (Page 8)
- 6. Panama: President Robles' position may be weakened by opposition to his economic reform program. (Page 9)
- 7. Cuba-Africa: Havana seeking to strengthen its ties with African states. (Page 10)
- 8. Bolivia: Student disorders assuming serious proportions. (Page 11)

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Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007900480001-2

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007900480001-2

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*USSR: Reports on the background and causes of Khrushchev's downfall continue to underline the importance of differences within the leadership, with some emphasizing his handling of economic problems and others the disarray in the Communist world.

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[redacted] the immediate cause of the coup against Khrushchev was Pravda's publication on 2 October of a misleading account of the late September meeting of top party and government officials on a new long-term economic plan. [redacted] although this meeting failed to reach agreement on final directives for the plan, Pravda's account sought to convey the impression of an agreed directive to de-emphasize heavy industry and defense. The purpose of the coup, [redacted] was to prevent this alleged directive from being converted into action.

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Kosygin was among those who opposed Khrushchev's line at the late September meeting. [redacted]

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[redacted] Kosygin's objections were based on grounds of economic rationality rather than on Khrushchev's projected downgrading of defense priorities. Kosygin reportedly argued that Khrushchev's plan would waste resources and that it would either be irreversible once under way or so costly to reverse as to "make nonsense of the whole exercise."

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[redacted] it was opposition to scaling down defense priorities that proved conclusive in bringing about Khrushchev's downfall and the defeat of his economic program. [redacted]

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[redacted] so far as the influence of any one

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person on the military side was predominant it was Marshal Sokolovsky's. He added that Sokolovsky might be called out of retirement to replace the late Marshal Biryuzov as chief of the general staff.

[The Rumanian ambassador in Paris told Ambassador Bohlen on 22 October that, in Bucharest's view, the chief cause was domestic and economic and that Khrushchev had proposed a series of unsound and, as it turned out, unacceptable schemes for dealing with a "very bad" economic situation. The ambassador also thought dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's handling of relations with other Communist countries had figured in his overthrow.]

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[the TASS representative in Athens also indicated that the primary reasons for Khrushchev's removal were more internal than external and that his opponents desire an even greater development of the Soviet economy than Khrushchev was willing to promote. The TASS representative claimed on 19 October that the new leaders plan an "early reinforcement of the economy" along lines pleasing to Soviet consumers.]

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[Suslov charged Khrushchev with arbitrary exercise of power, unwillingness to accept advice, nepotism, and rude and violent reaction to criticism or suggestions.]

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[there will be no basic change in relations with China and that the split is irreconcilable.]

Soviet press treatment since the coup suggests that the leaders are attempting to reassure the Soviet people that economic goals and operations remain

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unchanged. A 22 October Pravda editorial omits the traditional emphasis on heavy industry and does not mention the requirements of defense which have been stressed in other post-Khrushchev statements. On 24 October in Paris, Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev stated that Soviet economic policy "continues to be based on the raising of the population's standard of living and we are continuing to put the emphasis on light industry."

[Reports on foreign Communist reaction tend to give greater weight to Khrushchev's tactics in the conflict with Peiping as the immediate cause of his removal. These reactions in part reflect foreign Communist surprise at the abrupt changeover and concern that the new Soviet leaders may modify Khrushchev's China policy.]

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*Sudan: The dissolution of the Sudanese Supreme Military Council and cabinet and the formation of a new government under long-time Prime Minister General Ibrahim Abboud is aimed at conciliating widespread anti-regime sentiment.

Civilian opposition to the six-year old regime quickly consolidated after police crushed a student meeting at the University of Khartoum last week. Violent demonstrations, [confined at first to the Khartoum area, apparently spread to other northern cities] and a "national committee" including representatives of major civilian political and professional groups was established urging total participation in a general strike. Business and transportation came virtually to a standstill.

There is no evidence that either the demonstrations or the strike had been planned before the university meeting. The spontaneous spread of disorder, however, as well as the demonstrated capacity of the opposition for rapid organization, have led the government to adopt some compromise measures.

Abboud called for immediate convening of the Central Council, a puppet civilian group organized last year as a preliminary step towards the long-promised establishment of civilian government. [A new cabinet will reportedly be purged of some hard-line military leaders in a further attempt to demonstrate the Army's willingness to accede to civilian demands.]

Civilian opposition leaders are, however, unlikely to be allowed any meaningful participation in the new government. Abboud and his lieutenants will probably attempt to keep real power in the hands of the military.

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27 Oct 64

DAILY BRIEF

6

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UK-UAR-Aden: [The Labor government intends to make an effort to improve relations with the Arab governments, and especially the UAR.]

[As one of its first concerns, the Wilson government is closely reviewing Britain's Middle East policy. Foreign Secretary Walker has stated publicly that he looks forward to better relations with countries in the area, although both he and the Foreign Office expect that achieving this will be a lengthy process.]

[Walker has told the Foreign Office, however, that the interests of friends such as Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia must also be kept in mind, and that he is determined to protect specific British interests.]

[The foreign secretary is apparently already somewhat dubious about Nasir's reliability, although he has notified Nasir of his wish to develop better relations.]

[Colonial Secretary Greenwood is planning to visit Aden in about ten days, presumably to look into the possibility of constitutional changes and the acceleration of independence. Despite his sympathy for nationalist aspirations, however, Greenwood seems likely to find little room for maneuver.]

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Gabon: The French apparently have forced Gabonese President Leon Mba to step down.

Mba left for Paris on 23 October, and all indications are that he will not return to Libreville. The chief of the French aid mission in Gabon told the US chargé that Mba at first refused to leave the country but acceded when told by the French ambassador that the decision had been made in Paris and was irrevocable.

Paris had maintained Mba in power in the face of widespread opposition since restoring him to office after an abortive coup last February. During the past five weeks, however, Mba's goon squad had indulged in excessive brutality against opposition elements and even some local Europeans. This evidently was more than Paris would tolerate.

Neither Mba's legal successor, lackluster Vice President Yembit, nor any other person identified with the Mba regime is likely to be able to muster popular support. The French themselves have become so identified with Mba's authoritarianism that it will probably be difficult for France to retain control over any successor regime.

There has been no indication yet as to what Paris' next move will be.

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27 Oct 64

DAILY BRIEF

8

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Panama: [President Marco Robles' position may be weakened by opposition to his urgently needed economic reform program.]

[Powerful business interests and Arnulfo Arias' Panamenista Party, who have little in common except a determination to discredit Robles for their own purposes, are charging that the reforms are dictated by the United States. They may succeed in blocking legislative approval of the program.]

[This would probably disrupt Robles' position in the new assembly, in which he has a small and unstable majority. He would then find it difficult to muster legislative support for any agreement acceptable to the US on canal arrangements.]

[Robles is deeply concerned over the grave fiscal and other economic problems he inherited on 1 October. He made a strong appeal for public support in a speech on 22 October.]

[Perhaps as a counterbalance, Robles is moving to collect taxes from US oil companies based in the Zone which service ships transiting the canal. His government probably plans similar taxation of other private enterprises operating in the Zone, claiming that they operate outside the 1903 treaty provisions. Such action would help Robles refute charges of subordination to US interests.]

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Cuba-Africa: [The Cuban delegation to the recent Cairo conference of nonaligned nations was reportedly able to engage in effective cultivation of African chiefs of state]

[One result will probably be increased Cuban diplomatic representation in Africa.]

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25X1 [the discussions President Dorticos had in Cairo with African leaders may result in new Cuban diplomatic establishments in Burundi, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Dahomey, and possibly Nigeria. At present, Cuba maintains embassies in the UAR, Algeria, Morocco, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.]

25X1 [Cuba wants a "special relationship" with the Congo (Brazzaville) and has decided to furnish arms to that government.]

25X1 [Holden Roberto has received tentative offers of aid to his Angolan insurgency movement. Cuba apparently also agreed to provide and staff a hospital for Burundi.]

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*Bolivia: (information as of 0500 EST) The security situation is becoming increasingly serious as the government braces for another round of violent disturbances today.

Rioting broke out yesterday in Oruro, a mining town some 150 miles south of La Paz, and in Sucre, and Potosi in southeastern Bolivia. At least three students were killed in Oruro when extremists, joined by leftist-led miners, turned an anti-government student demonstration into a full scale riot. In Sucre, students destroyed the radio station and sacked the homes of government officials.

Serious trouble is expected in La Paz today. Students plan a march to commemorate the death of a student killed in rioting last week. The communist-controlled radio station at Huanuni, a mining center near Oruro, is exhorting miners to attend protest demonstrations in Oruro today, and students plan further demonstrations in Sucre and Potosi. In uneasy Cochabamba, the scene of bloody riots last week, officials have declared a state of emergency in anticipation of further violence.

So far security forces have managed to restore order with a minimum of difficulty. Stocks of anti-riot equipment are running low, however, and simultaneous uprisings throughout the country will severely tax the ability of the police and the military to control the situation.

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